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Abstract 
Nuclear nonproliferation efforts traditionally have focused on controlling the supply of 
proliferation-relevant technology, material, and expertise. As barriers to diffusion of all three 
have been lowered, there is increased acknowledgement of the need to reduce demand for such 
weapons, and, in cases where efforts to prevent proliferation have failed, the need to develop 
effective international responses. However, with few exceptions, approaches to nonproliferation 
have remained qualitatively the same over the last sixty years. In addition, many states whose 
active support is essential, view nonproliferation as primarily a U.S. issue and in some cases see 
U.S. military superiority as a more serious threat to their security than nuclear proliferation. Such 
states are often unresponsive to requests to strengthen their nonproliferation efforts. In this paper 
we develop a basic systems dynamics model of the process of proliferation against which 
nonproliferation strategies can be assessed. This basic model includes both processes of 
acquisition of nuclear weapons and processes that motivate states to seek nuclear weapons. Next 
we develop simple models of nonproliferation strategies and demonstrate how they impact the 
process of proliferation. We then offer observations about the relative impact of different 
strategies, given hypothetical initial and boundary conditions. Finally, we recommend additional 
work to improve the model and make it accessible to the nonproliferation community both for 
discussion and for testing hypotheses. 
Introduction 
Nuclear nonproliferation efforts have evolved over time in response to a changing international 
environment. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards coupled with diplomacy 
were the prevailing nonproliferation strategies until the Indian nuclear test in 1974, which 
triggered much more intensive efforts on international export control and the formation of the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group. The end of the Soviet Union in 1991 and fears of unsecured nuclear 
weapons and material resulted in creation of a broad range of cooperative threat reduction efforts 
to improve nuclear security; in the same time frame, the failure of the IAEA to detect the Iraqi 
nuclear program led to the IAEA Additional Protocol.  Since 9/11 many new approaches have 
been tried, ranging from capacity building to help developing countries implement 
nonproliferation obligations, to the Proliferation Security Initiative aimed at interdicting illicit 
shipments. There have also been calls for internationalization of portions of the nuclear fuel 
cycle and for reducing the salience (and numbers) of nuclear weapons. 
 
                                                 
* Sandia National Laboratories is a multiprogram laboratory operated by Sandia Corporation, a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security 
Administration under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000. 
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These efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons take place within a global system of states, 
each of which has its own domestic concerns and reasons for participation in the nonproliferation 
regime. This large “system of systems” is both complex and adaptive. It is complex (not simply 
complicated) because it is composed of many, many similar parts that interact to create emergent 
behavior (e.g., economic bubbles, wars) and structure (e.g., supply networks, treaties and 
influence networks). It is adaptive because it contains humans and human institutions that learn 
and modify their interactions over time. Thus, to be effective, nonproliferation strategies must be 
able to influence a complex adaptive system of systems to limit the spread of nuclear weapons.  
 
Because of this complexity, it is difficult to predict (or even understand) the ultimate impact of 
nonproliferation strategies. However, analysis tools and methodologies have been developed to 
understand the behavior of complex adaptive systems in other disciplines and could be applied to 
nonproliferation. The purpose of this paper is to take the first step in establishing a formal 
systems analysis framework and methodology to evaluate and design nonproliferation strategies.  
 
This first step consists of a graphical conceptual model of the process of proliferation and 
strategies that are intended to influence it. The proliferation model includes a description of why 
states seek nuclear weapons (NW) as well how they acquire them. We also enumerate 
nonproliferation strategies and show how they may impact the process of proliferation. Our goal 
at this stage is to achieve a clear representation of the process of proliferation and the intended 
(and unintended) impacts of nonproliferation strategies. Future steps to mathematically 
implement the conceptual model will allow evaluation of the trade-offs between costs and 
benefits of various strategies.  
Conceptual Model of Proliferation  
The graphical conceptual model is based on system dynamics modeling methodology. In this 
methodology, models consist of four types of elements: 
 Stocks are nouns that represent accumulations of things (states with nuclear weapons, 
states with nuclear technology, available nuclear technology) or states of being 
(insecurity, inequity, isolation). The stocks are represented by rectangles in the model. 
 Flows represent actions or activities that influence the level of stocks. Flows can be 
physical processes such as acquisition of nuclear weapons or nuclear technology, or non-
physical, such as threatening a state’s security or denouncing a states’ behavior. Flows 
are represented by pipes with arrows in the direction of flow. 
 Connectors join components of a model: they transmit actions and information required 
to generate flows. When a connector links a stock back to its flow, a feedback loop is 
created. Feedbacks (either positive or negative) introduce nonlinearity to the structure of 
the system. Connectors are represented by arrows. 
 Convertors modify flows and provide information about how quickly or slowly an action 
happens. They are represented by circles. 
Using this graphical language, we begin with a very simple view of proliferation. At its core are 
four basic stocks: states without nuclear weapons (NNWS), states without nuclear weapons but 
with the capability to make nuclear weapons (Capable NNWS), states possessing nuclear 
weapons (NWS), and states that have disarmed (Disarmed States) (see Figure 1). These stocks 
are connected by three processes: acquiring the capability to make nuclear weapons, acquiring 
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nuclear weapons, and disarming. Although states that have disarmed could technically be 
considered Capable NNWS, we treat them as a separate category, primarily because 
reconstitution of a nuclear weapons capability (should they choose to re-arm) would be very 
different from the process of acquiring nuclear weapons in the first place. 
Two critical factors influence the direction and rate of flows embodied by the acquiring and 
disarming processes: 1) motivation to pursue and acquire nuclear weapons, and 2) technological 
capability, which we describe as consisting of nuclear material, technology and expertise 
(NTME). These elements are depicted in Figure 1 with arrows denoting influence: without 
motivation a state will neither acquire nor give up nuclear weapons. Similarly, the availability of 
nuclear material, technology and expertise is essential for successful acquisition.  
In this simple model the paths denoted by flows between the different stocks are depicted as 
flowing only in one direction. In practice, they could change direction, but the process would be 
hysteric, i.e., different from simple reversal. This is because the state of the system is path 
dependent, a multi-valued function of motivation and capability that depends on history. For 
example, reversing the acquisition path may require more (or less) motivation once certain steps 
along the path have been accomplished. 
Figure 1.  Basic model of the process created using STELLATM software.i 
 
 
Adding Structure to Motivation and Capability 
Motivation to pursue a nuclear weapons program is generally thought to stem from a 
combination of causes: national security concerns, prestige (or status) associated with nuclear 
weapons, and domestic politics.ii In the model, we represent this by showing that motivation 
increases or decreases as a function of a state’s security or status, with the degree determined (at 
SAND 2011-3768C 
4 
 
least in part) by domestic politics. We treat “domestic politics” differently from “security” or 
“status:” whereas security and status are stocks that can increase or decrease, domestic politics is 
a factor in determining, for a given degree of security or status, how motivated a state will be to 
pursue a nuclear weapons program. These same conceptual elements influence the motivation to 
disarm, although the functional relationships will be different. 
Capability to develop nuclear weapons depends on access to nuclear material, technology and 
expertise (NTME). States may acquire this capability from a variety of sources, which we 
represent in the model by “available NTME.” Available NTME accumulates through a variety of 
processes, e.g., natural diffusion of technical capability, clandestine activities, or black market 
networks. However the exact mechanisms are not important for the purposes of this basic model. 
This simple representation of capability and motivation, coupled with the processes of acquiring 
nuclear weapons and disarming is shown in Figure 2. More detail could be added, but this is 
sufficient for the next step: thinking about how and where strategies impact the system. For the 
sake of brevity, we will focus in the remainder of our paper on nonproliferation strategies and 
defer analysis of disarmament strategies to the future. 
 
Figure 2. Adding structure to motivation and capability. 
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Nonproliferation Strategies 
Nonproliferation strategies have evolved over time in response to changes in the proliferation 
landscape. They can be thought of both in terms of their intended impact and their possible 
unintended consequences, as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1.  Nonproliferation strategies.  Yellow indicates that the strategy is intended to influence capability, blue that 
it is intended to influence motivation, and green indicates both. 
Strategy Intended Impact Possible Unintended Consequences 
Classification of 
Information 
Restrict availability of NW-relevant 
information. 
 
Security Alliances Increase security of states in alliance. Could decrease security of states outside.  
IAEA Safeguards Restrict availability of nuclear material 
(implemented in NNWS) 
Asymmetry between NWS and NNWS may 
reinforce sense that NWS have higher status.  
Diplomatic Pressure Change the “motivation” calculus.  If public, could fuel domestic political 
arguments for NW. 
Sanctions Punish states for illicit nuclear programs to 
change the “motivation” calculus. 
Could be perceived as unjust and reinforce 
sense that NW brings status. 
Export Control Limit availability and prevent acquisition of 
NTME. 
Could be perceived as unjust and reinforce 
sense that NW brings status. Short supply 
could increase demand for NTME. 
Military Action Slow or disrupt the process of acquiring 
nuclear weapons or NTME. Reduce 
motivation of other countries to attempt to 
acquire NTME or NW. Could also be used to 
forcefully disarm a NWS. 
Could decrease security in states that fear they 
could be a future target. Could be perceived as 
unjust and reinforce sense that NW brings 
both security and status. 
Cooperative Threat 
Reduction 
Limit availability and prevent acquisition of 
nuclear weapons and NTME. 
 
Missile Defense Protect states from attack by nuclear missiles, 
and thereby increase their security. Deny 
military value of nuclear weapons to 
proliferators, thereby reducing their 
motivation to acquire NW to improve security. 
Could decrease security of states outside 
protective shield. 
IAEA Additional 
Protocol (AP) 
Disrupt the process of acquiring NTME / NW 
by early detection of clandestine activities. 
Could be perceived as unjust by NNWS, and 
reinforce sense that NW brings status. 
Proliferation Security 
Initiative (PSI) 
Disrupt the process of acquiring NTME / NW 
by detecting and interdicting illicit shipments 
of nuclear material and technology  
Could be perceived as against international 
law, and reduce commitment to NPT. 
Capacity Building Restrict availability of NTME by improving 
international capabilities to prevent theft or 
unauthorized transfer. 
 
Nuclear Arms 
Reductions 
Enhance commitment to NPT by NNWS. Could increase security concerns by states 
under so-called “nuclear umbrellas. 
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Figure 3 provides a mapping of the intended impacts of nonproliferation strategies onto the basic 
model.iii Most strategies are aimed at limiting capability by preventing states from becoming 
“NW-capable” or limiting the widespread availability of nuclear material, technology, and 
expertise (each of these processes is the target of 6 strategies). Of the strategies that aim to 
impact motivation, only two are intended to enhance security and those focus on only a subset of 
states. None are intended to increase the status of states without nuclear weapons. At this stage 
we have not attempted to quantify the effectiveness of nonproliferation strategies. 
Figure 3. Intended impacts of nonproliferation strategies. 
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Figure 4 shows a mapping of the possible unintended consequences of nonproliferation strategies 
onto the basic model. Interestingly, the unintended consequences of four of the nonproliferation 
strategies decrease security of some states and four also act to decrease the status of states (either 
in its own eyes or possibly in the eyes of others). We have made no attempt to quantify the 
strength of the unintended consequences relative to intended impacts (which will depend on 
specific circumstances), but the mapping demonstrates that some strategies might actually have 
the opposite of the intended impact.  
Figure 4. Possible unintended consequences of nonproliferation strategies. 
 
 
We thought of no unintended consequences for three of the strategies: cooperative threat 
reduction, building nonproliferation capacity, and classifying information. However, with regard 
to the last, we note that when information is widely available, the strategy of classifying 
information can lead to a false sense of security. The same is the case for export control 
measures. 
We highlight two examples of the differences between intended impacts and unintended 
consequences of nonproliferation strategies (without commenting on their relative strengths). 
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The first is the proposal by George W. Bush in February 2004 to prohibit the export of uranium 
enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing technologies except to those states that already possessed 
them. The intent was to limit the availability of technology required to make nuclear weapons 
material, especially given the expected growth in nuclear energy world-wide. However, the 
unintended consequence was opposition by several states, including nonproliferation stalwarts 
(and uranium producers) Canada and Australia who did not wish to permanently give up the 
option to enrich uranium, (which would allow them to extract additional economic benefit). Both 
countries announced their intention of exploring acquisition of enrichment capabilities within a 
few months. Unable to convince the Nuclear Suppliers Group to adopt the new export control 
policy, it eventually died.  
A second example is the Obama administration’s embrace of the eventual elimination of nuclear 
weapons and announcement of measures to reduce the salience and size of the U.S. nuclear 
arsenal. The intent was to demonstrate U.S. commitment to eventual nuclear disarmament (NPT 
Article VI) and thereby to increase the motivation of NNWS to implement their nonproliferation 
obligations vigorously, and it has received approval by many NNWS.  However, some states 
under the so-called nuclear umbrella of the United States feared that the new policy could signal 
reduced U.S. commitment to their security.  
While we do not suggest that the mappings shown in Figures 3 and 4 are completely accurate, we 
find that the process of graphical representation of the impacts of nonproliferation strategies can 
lead to productive discussion and provides the basis for more rigorous future analysis. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
While any analysis of a complex issue presumes a mental model of the system being analyzed, 
graphical modeling using a systems-dynamic methodology forces clarity, can lay assumptions 
bare and yield insights that otherwise may not be apparent. Creation of a mathematical model 
forces an addition round of clarification as mathematical functions must be formulated and 
supported with data or heuristics.  
This relatively simple graphical model of nonproliferation highlights that both motivation and 
capability play an important role in determining whether a state is ultimately successful in 
acquiring nuclear weapons. The relative paucity of nonproliferation strategies aimed at shifting 
the motivational calculus, especially in a non-coercive manner, suggests that further attention to 
developing cooperative approaches that reduce motivation is needed. Furthermore, recognizing 
that security and status are ultimately indicators of standing in a much broader global regime, it 
is important to explore how measures outside of the nonproliferation regime itself (e.g., 
cooperation on trade, economics, environmental issues, etc.) could enhance the regime. We 
believe that identifying additional measures that can improve security and enhance status of non-
nuclear weapon states, and mapping their intended impacts and potential unintended 
consequences are some of the important next steps for this work.iv 
Much more historical data would be required to ascertain whether the unintended consequences 
hypothesized in Table 1 actually have materialized and to assess the relative impacts of strategies 
and their unintended consequences. As changes are proposed, such data will be useful in 
predicting the likely effectiveness of proposed measures, as well as determining allocation of 
time and resources among many competing strategies. It will be difficult to distinguish between 
the possible outcomes of alternative strategies without a quantitative model that supports both 
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uncertainty analysis and cost/benefit analysis. Thus taking the next step toward developing a 
mathematical representation will be important in enhancing the utility of this model.  
We are considering what mathematical formulations to use in this next step. We note that the 
simplicity of the system dynamics approach and its emphasis on feedbacks can be useful in 
identifying domains of behavior. However, as we examine the list of possible unintended 
consequences for current measures, it becomes clear that the impact of a strategy will be 
different depending on which state (or group of states) is implementing it and which state (or 
states) is the target. Therefore, while we can represent the intended impacts of strategies in a 
simple lumped or aggregated model, their actual impact will be more complex and will require 
representation that recognizes the internal structure or connections between individual states 
within the global system. 
For instance, an aggregate mathematical model of the conceptual model presented in this paper 
would contain an equation that describes the rate at which states seek or acquire nuclear weapons 
as a function of their motivation and capability. Realistically, such an equation will depend on 
the specifics of individual states. This suggests that using an agent-based approach in which each 
individual nation is represented, could be beneficial. The same conceptualizations for 
proliferation processes would apply to each individual state but would be augmented with 
international interactions and perceptions of other nation’s intentions. 
In summary, the authors have presented a graphical model of the nonproliferation regime 
including an assessment of both the intended and unintended impacts of many nonproliferation 
measures. The model highlights the disparity between measures aimed at reducing the 
motivation to acquire nuclear weapons and the measures aimed at controlling nuclear 
technology, materials, and expertise. This model can be further enhanced in at least three 
different ways. One next step is to identify new strategies to strengthen the sense of security and 
status for members of the nonproliferation regime without needing to acquire nuclear weapons. 
These strategies could be mapped out to identify both intended and unintended consequences. 
Second, developing mathematical formulations for the processes represented in the model, 
including the mechanisms by which nonproliferation strategies impact their rates, will force 
additional clarity and help assess the benefits of going on to a full mathematical model. Third, 
the enhanced model could serve as the context for developing an agent-based approach that 
allowed exploration interactions and impacts at the individual nation level. 
                                                 
i STELLA is a registered trademark of isee systems, inc.  
http://www.iseesystems.com/softwares/Educatin/StellaSoftware.aspx  
ii ii Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International 
Security 21 (3) Winter 1996/1997), pp. 54 – 86. 
iii We understand that “commitment to the NPT” has a number of operational effects, including a commitment to 
implement export control, border security, material security, etc. Therefore, in the conceptual model we represent it 
as influencing the process “accumulating NTME.” High commitment to NPT would decrease the rate of 
accumulation, whereas low commitment might increase it. In addition, increasing commitment to the NPT would 
likely correspond to reducing motivation to seek nuclear weapons. 
iv The suggestion to include one or more non-nuclear weapon states in good standing with the NPT as permanent 
members of the U.N. Security Council is an example. 
